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WORLD COMMUNIST AFFAIRS

30 August-26 September 1966

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COMMUNIST CHINA

1. The Chinese "cultural revolution" which got under way early this summer and which developed further in August and September has become a historic phenomenon with effects reaching far beyond the borders of China. Some observers have compared the rampages of the "Red Guards" with the Jew-baiting of the Nazi SA in the first years of the Hitler regime. As with the SA, the Red Guards have been encouraged or at least permitted to engage in pseudo-revolutionary "action," which often amounts to licensed vandalism. But unlike Hitler's storm troopers, the Red Guards aim their violence not only at helpless minorities (though they do some of that too), but also at officials of the party and government itself. One goal seems to be to terrorize and purge the party apparatus, somewhat as Stalin purged the CPSU in the 1930s.

2. But while Stalin relied on the NKVD, the secret police, which he ruthlessly kept under his thumb, Mao -- if it is not already Lin Piao who really pulls the levers now -- uses teenage gangs, apparently with some tie-ins with the People's Liberation Army. The revelations of the defector Miao Chen-pai (30 August) show that Mao acted a year ago to stifle criticism and possible opposition, much as Stalin used to do. But unlike the NKVD, the Red Guard movement as it now has developed is not a well-calibrated instrument for purging senior party members; to a large extent, it seems to reflect Mao's desperate desire to keep the "revolution" alive and to relive his revolutionary past. The Red Guard may also be part of a gamble for power by Lin Piao as against possible rivals; he seems especially anxious to direct it against party cadres (see 15 September), and he may be guiding it more closely through political advisers borrowed from the army.

3. Many questions about the "cultural revolution" remain unanswered at present. But one thing has become quite clear; the Red Guards have caused fear and unrest and have disrupted production. Increasingly, publications and party leaders have told the Red Guards to use reason and not force, to show discipline, and not to interfere with the workers and peasants (31 August, 15 September, 16 September, 18 September). Sometimes contrasting articles in the same publication (e.g., Red Flag, 16 September) or speeches from the same platform (Lin Piao and Chou En-lai, 15 September) suggest that a

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struggle may be going on between those (esp. Lin) who want to carry the cultural revolution further, and those (esp. Chou) who want to restrain it to avoid damage to production or even to avert local revolts. Those who, like Chou, urge restraint run the risk of being themselves accused of revisionism. In this respect the situation recalls the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution in 1793.

4. Mao's cult of continuing revolution, while so far largely "revolution by order," is fundamentally anarchic. (Hostile Soviet propagandists may yet compare Mao with Marx's old anarchist rival Bakunin as well as with Trotsky; the epithet "anarchist" has already been applied by the East German Politburo member Hermann Axen (15 September)). Society cannot function properly under conditions like those created by the Red Guard; a machinist cannot run his lathe efficiently if some teenager insists on reciting the works of Mao in his ear. A manager cannot run his plant if he has to listen to and follow the allegedly Mao-inspired ideas of some young student. Some reports have indicated that local CCP leaders have been ready to fight rather than submit to Red Guard dictation.

5. On the other hand, Mao is quite right in believing that party and governmental officials, if left in peace, will become revisionist and bourgeois. This is a basic contradiction in Communism: its adherents cannot both run a country and remain revolutionaries. In China the violence will probably be curbed eventually, and, as after the Great Leap Forward, Chinese leaders will once again have to recognize that there are limits to what will power and terror can accomplish -- in fact that these things are counter-productive. And it is hard to see how this admission can be made without some damage to Mao's reputation.

6. At present, however, it is possible that Chinese leaders think that the cultural revolution is actually a way of strengthening China for a war with the United States. (See statement of Yoshui Furui, 7 September.) The cultural revolution would seem to have the aim, among others, of eliminating or silencing anyone who might conceivably argue for compromise in international affairs, or for a negotiated peace. In any case, Chicom output has established new records for sycophancy in its praise of Chairman Mao, and Peking is obviously not at present a setting for calm, rational discussion.

ICM AND "SOCIALIST CAMP" AFFAIRS

7. If Lin and Mao had laid careful plans for alienating Communists abroad, they could hardly have done better than they have done with the cultural revolution. True, some parties, such as the North Vietnamese, the Rumanian, and (on the whole) the Polish, have abstained from criticism. Albania remains faithful, as do of course such marionettes as the Belgian, Jacques Grippa, and E. F. Hill of Australia. But the outlets of other parties -- even including North Korea -- reach a high pitch in denouncing the cultural revolution and the Red Guards. They profess to believe that the chief

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Chinese "error" is the violation of "socialist unity" in the midst of the Vietnam War. But it seems likely that in reality Peking's worst sin in their eyes is the attack on party cadres. CP officials the world over have strong views on this subject; they would not like to see the precedent followed in their own bailiwicks. Neither do they like the ridicule to which Red Guard excesses expose not only China, but the whole movement. (Note Soviet quotation of Cuban comment, 31 August.) Chicom attacks on western culture have also run afoul of the cultural aspirations of the European parties, and East German and Soviet citizens seem to have been physically attacked by the Red Guards. Soviet output makes the most of criticism of Peking from other parties, implicitly taking the line that the Chicoms have read themselves out of the movement.

8. Peking seems to be aware of its isolation and makes ineffectual attempts to answer the Moscow roundups of ICM criticism by quoting praise of Mao from such sources as Grippa, Hill, the Chilean Revolutionary CP, and Afro-Asian writers still lingering in Peking after the pro-Chicom writers' meeting in July. (14, 17, 20 September) And the Chicoms are enraged when the Japanese government refuses to issue passports to Japanese youths intending to attend the Second Sino-Japanese Youth Friendship Festival. But on 21 September Peking informs foreign embassies that all foreign students must return home in two weeks apparently because there will be no classes for an indefinite period

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INTERNATIONAL FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

9. The pro-Soviet faction of the Afro-Asian Writers Organization meets in Baku from 29 August to 1 September and issues a statement on Vietnam saying: "Let the fiery words of the writers of the world arouse the conscience of all honest people of the world and call them to a united struggle against the imperialist aggressors." As the Chinese delight in pointing out, the meeting is not really an Afro-Asian meeting even in appearance; many of the non-Soviet delegates are not African or Asian (e.g., Hans-Magnus Enzensberger) and the full title of the gathering is "Enlarged Meeting of the Soviet Committee for Relations with Afro-Asian Writers." But following a meeting of the "Afro-Asian Writers Executive Committee" on 25 September, TASS announces plans for a 3rd Afro-Asian writers conference to be held in Beirut in February-March 1967.

SOVIET AFFAIRS

10. The Soviet attack on China (see also above) receives official expression in a diplomatic protest of 26 August (over events connected with Chicom demonstrations before the Soviet Embassy in Peking -- see #5) and in a 31 August CPSU Central Committee statement, accusing the CPR leaders of "again provoking a sharp deterioration of relations between the USSR and the CPR," and blaming them for damage to Communist unity and to the struggle

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"for socialism, national liberation, peace, and the security of peoples." On the whole, however, the Soviets prefer to attack the Chicoms by using critical statements from other parties.

11. Meanwhile the Soviets seek to exploit Gaullism, U.S. preoccupation with South Vietnam, and widespread criticism of the U.S. role in the Vietnamese war to press their campaign for an all-European security conference, designed to exclude the U.S. from European affairs and to isolate the West German government. Izvestiya reports on 11 September that the security issue was the topic of the talks between Walter Ulbricht and top Soviet leaders on the 10th and 11th, and Gromyko's 23 September speech to the UN, while denouncing the U.S. and its peace proposals for Vietnam, devotes even more attention to German and European security questions, saying, "Europe still remains the barometer of the world's political weather." This European security conference proposal had been revived at the 23rd CPSU Congress in March and it was made bloc policy at the Bucharest conference of the Warsaw Pact states (4-6 July), which also called for an abolition of NATO and Warsaw Pact organizations, reductions in the two German armies, and the withdrawal of foreign (i.e., American) troops. The other East European regimes have been supporting the campaign, for example during the visit of Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel in Warsaw (5-8 September).

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NORTH VIETNAM

12. The National Day of the DRV, 2 September, is observed in Hanoi with Pham Van Dong reaffirming a will to fight on until victory. Other CPs vie in sending messages expressing their support for North Vietnam in its "struggle with imperialism." The DRV is careful not to antagonize either the CPR or the USSR; a DRV economic delegation tours Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania while Czech Premier Jozef Lenart leads a delegation to Hanoi on 23 September. Soviet exports to North Vietnam are revealed to have increased from 42.9 million rubles in 1964 to 67.1 million rubles in 1965, not including military aid.

EAST EUROPE

13. In a blaze of publicity, the Warsaw Pact powers conduct the Vltava maneuvers (20-22 September), centering around Ceske Budejovice, Czechoslovakia. Aside from military training, the objects of the exercise seem to be to promote military-mindedness in Bloc countries, to impress Western Europeans with the might of the Warsaw Pact countries, and to provide a peg for further denunciation of the alleged West German threat.

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EAST GERMANY

14. Following Ulbricht's talks in Moscow (see above), the SED Central Committee holds its 13th plenum (15-17 September), at which Hermann Axen delivers one of the sharpest anti-Chicom addresses yet made. Ulbricht's keynote speech to the plenum criticizes the Chinese in passing, but mainly stresses European security and the question of the two Germanies. Inter alia, he says: "Since the establishment of the two German states, the situation has developed in such a way and the power balance in Europe is such that the extended coexistence of the two German states must be anticipated." In answer to West German comments that this means the GDR has given up all idea of reunification, Neues Deutschland later says that that is "a lie"; it is only that West Germany is morally unfit for reunification. In his speech on 23 September, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko calls for the admission of the GDR to the United Nations.

NORTH KOREA

15. According to Pravda, which reprints excerpts, Rodong Shinmoon publishes an editorial on "Trotskyism" on 18 September, stating that the Trotskyites "claimed that the improvement of material and cultural conditions of the people under Socialism would lead to corruption and degradation of the society and create the danger of the restoration of capitalism," "emphatically objected to combining violent and nonviolent methods in the revolutionary struggle," and "tried their utmost to unite their supporters in various countries by inciting them to engineer a split in the ranks of the international Communist movement." Thus, without naming China, the editorial applies the label of "Trotskyism" to views which today are associated with Peking, and thereby indirectly accuses Peking of Trotskyism.

CUBA

16. Lazaro Pena, one of the last of the pre-Castro Cuban Communist leaders to hold office, is removed from his post as Secretary General of the Cuban Confederation of Labor.

17. A speech by Armando Hart, Cuban Politburo member and organizing secretary, is published in Granma on 19 September, after delivery earlier in the month at a secret meeting at Santiago de Cuba. Hart charges that Cuban officials are indecisive and unaggressive, that they are "enclosed in a vicious circle of constant party reunions" instead of keeping in touch with the masses, and that farm managers are often dismissed by political officials who know even less about agrarian matters than the man just replaced. Hart also comments:

"We have some positive and some negative experiences. It is not a secret to any Cuban Communist that the world Communist movement is going through a tremendous crisis ... [This crisis] is not confined,

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of course, within a polemic between two parties or a group of parties, but is something deeper and broader. Old concepts and habits of revolutionary work are being destroyed. Many of the erroneous notions about Communist organizational methods [in Cuba] are not foreign to this crisis."

On the whole, Hart's complaints seem to be aimed at Chinese influences, rather than Soviet. An article in Granma on 31 August ridiculed the application of Mao's thought to activities ranging from ping pong to selling melons.

VENEZUELA

18. Que, the PCV weekly, follows up 26 August criticism of hard-line dissidents with a letter of protest to the Cuban Communist party, published 9 September. The Cuban Communists are charged with giving open support to the dissidents, in violation of "sisterly party relations."

SWEDEN

19. In local elections held on 18 September, the SCP vote increases 2.4 percent, raising its total to 6.6 percent, while the Social Democratic vote falls from 51 percent to 42.8 percent. This result leads to speculation that the ruling Social Democrats may decide to hold national elections ahead of the 1968 deadline, or that the Social Democrats and the Communists might collaborate.

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CHRONOLOGY

August 29-30: A crowd estimated as "more than a million" demonstrates near the Soviet Embassy in Peking on August 30. On the previous day a formal ceremony was held in front of the Embassy in connection with the renaming of the street to "Anti-Revisionism Street."

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August 29-September 1: An "enlarged meeting" of the Soviet Committee for Relations with Asian and African Writers takes place in Baku, attended by writers from the 15 Soviet republics and a claimed 50 writers from Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. The meeting is transparently Soviet, as shown by the final paragraph of its protest on Vietnam:

"Let the fiery words of the writers of the world arouse the conscience of all honest people of the world and call them to a united struggle against the imperialist aggressors. In this hour of severe trial for the Vietnamese people we, the Soviet writers, assure our brother writers of Vietnam of our burning sympathy and support. We firmly believe that the just Vietnamese cause will triumph."

But on 2 September, an "Afro-Asian Writers' Executive Committee" meeting is held, also in Baku, under Mursi Saad ed-Din. On 9 September the head of the pro-Chicom faction of the Afro-Asian Writers Bureau, R. D. Senanayake, issues a statement denouncing the Baku "enlarged meeting" and claiming that only 17 Afro-Asian countries were represented. Moscow announces that, pursuant to the Executive Committee decision and following a preparatory meeting to be held in Cairo in October, the (pro-Soviet) Afro-Asian Writers will convene for their 3rd Conference next February-March in Beirut.

August 30: Ex-Chicom diplomat Miao Chen-pai (who had asked for U.S. asylum) tells the New York press that the current Chicom purges started after the Peking party leader Peng Chen suggested at a propaganda cadre meeting in September 1965 that everyone was equal in the face of truth, and that even Mao should be criticized if he was wrong. Lu Ting-yi, head of the party propaganda department, had also spoken at this meeting, attacking Stalin; Mao had considered this tantamount to an attack on himself.

August 31: The Red Guards hold a major rally in Peking, attended by Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai. As at the 18 August rally, Mao does not speak. Lin tells the Guards not to "hit people," but emphasizes that they are the "shock force" fighting in the van of the great cultural revolution and a powerful reserve force of the People's Liberation Army." Chou is slightly less laudatory, saying, "Our Red Guards will surely mature through struggles and become pathbreakers who display

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both intelligence and courage." Both the speeches and the personalities present at the rally confirm that the armed forces have gained status at the expense of the party machine.

August 31: The Central Committee of the CPSU issues a statement charging the CCP with "slander" and with provoking a "sharp deterioration in relations" with the Soviets. Using a technique which they follow throughout the period, the Soviets also publicize statements from other parties critical of the Chinese: on this occasion, TASS reports a protest by the GDR Foreign Ministry over the physical attack (on 28 August) by Chinese citizens on the wife and son of Lt. Col. Kautzsch, the GDR Military Attache in Peking; TASS also reports a French CP Politburo statement saying that the conduct of the Chinese leaders is rendering a great service to "the aggressors" by splitting the socialist forces. (Aside from the attack on the Kautzsches, a Soviet protest note to the CPR dated 26 August -- before the big demonstrations of 29 and 30 August -- indicated that Soviet diplomats had been forced to get out of their car and return to their embassy, that "actions humiliating human dignity" had been committed against a Soviet consular official, and that someone among the demonstrators outside the embassy had thrown a stone at a Soviet official who was standing on embassy grounds.)

August 31: The Cuban CP daily, Granma, says that the Chinese campaign glorifying Mao Tse-tung is ridiculous, and is harmful to the world Communist movement. Granma scoffs at the application of Mao's thought to such things as burns, ping pong and selling melons.

September 1: World CP's vie in sending congratulations and assurances of support to Hanoi on the 21st anniversary of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Pham Van Dong's keynote speech recalls Ho Chi Minh's warning that the war could last 20 years and that the DRV cities may be destroyed; Pham Van Dong also pleads for aid from the Communist bloc nations.

September 1: In a speech first reported on September 4, Tito calls for a "top to bottom" reorganization of the Yugoslav League of Communists. Saying that the party has "lost influence and significance" in recent years, Tito goes on to state that there are elements in the party organizations which have nothing in common with Communism: "In universities, in schools and in other sectors, there are people of a class alien to us. We must purge the League of Communists of such elements."

September 3: Czech First Secretary Antonin Novotny, in a speech to military academy graduates at Prague, says:

"The latest developments in China, where a so-called 'cultural revolution' is taking place, carried out by students and children, is the confirmation of our criticism of the attitude of the CCP. This revolution is [supposed] to insure that China remains true to revolutionary principles and that youths which head the

movement become the moving force of this process. In reality, this movement has nothing in common with class-consciousness, but is meant to incite hatred mainly against the Soviet Union, which is absurdly accused of an alliance with the United States."

September 5: Aubert Lounda, a member of the Central Committee and the Politburo of the National Revolutionary Movement of Congo-Brazzaville, is feted at banquet in Peking; on September 10 he meets with Chen Yi. A parliamentary delegation from Congo-Brazzaville, headed by Andre Georges Mouyabi, also tours China during this period, visiting Peking, Nanking, Changsha, Hangchow, and Shanghai.

September 5-8: Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel visits Warsaw, meets with Ochab, Rapacki, and others. According to PAP's report of the communique, "The ministers [i.e., Harmel and the Polish ministers] stated that a conference on security and cooperation in Europe could play a positive role and stressed the necessity of making efforts to prepare for the conference properly." Harmel reportedly tells a press conference that the political horizon is dimmed as a result of the conflict in Vietnam, but despite this fact, as far as Europe is concerned no time should be wasted in the work aimed at a detente.

September 7: Foreign Minister Chen Yi is widely reported in non-Communist media to have told Japanese MPs visiting Peking that China wants no clash with the United States and is not necessarily dismissing the idea of talks with the U.S. on Vietnam. Later reporting, based on comments by the Japanese delegation leader, Zentaro Kosaka, indicates that the Chinese were very unhappy about this story, and that it probably distorted Chen Yi's remarks. Possibly to counter any idea that Peking has "gone soft on imperialism," Ambassador Wang Kuo-chuan flouts the tradition of secrecy attending the periodic U.S.-Chinese talks in Warsaw, and gives the press the text of his ultra-hard-line remarks at his 7 September meeting with U.S. Ambassador Gronouski. On 15 September, the Soviet periodical Life Abroad publishes most of the text of the 7 September Agence France Presse report of Chen Yi's remarks, and comments that Chen Yi's statement that "Peking does not necessarily exclude the idea of talks with the United States" had "elicited great interest in Washington and sparked comment throughout the world." This appears to be part of Moscow's attempt to reply to Chicom charges that the USSR and the U.S. are cooperating in a "peace hoax on Vietnam." (In a September 7 comment on Chen Yi's statements, Japanese delegate Yoshimi Furui states that Chen Yi, in explaining the cultural revolution, said: "If the U.S. should attack China, traitors, if any, would ruin the country." The Japanese Liberal Democratic delegate also said that "to understand what is going on in China today [the Japanese people] must recall the hectic days they experienced just before the Pacific war and during the turbulent years of the Meiji restoration." After returning to Tokyo, Zentaro Kosaka also comments that the Chinese seem to be preparing for war.)

September 7: In virtually the only explicit Polish comment on events in China to be made in this period, Trybuna Ludu adds to a factual report:

"It appears from the above facts that in the events connected with 'cultural revolution' much prominence is given to slogans aimed against the unity of the international Communist and workers' movement. These events are followed carefully and with anxiety by the Communist movement and other progressive forces."

However, Trybuna Ludu publishes criticism of China from other parties: e.g., from the Finnish CP on September 16; from the CPUSA on September 18; from the Swiss CP on 21 September; and the Turkish CP on 22 September. Articles by Trybuna Ludu's Peking correspondent, though purportedly factual, imply that the Red Guard is barbarous and disruptive of public order.

September 7: A. Ya Pelshe, a Soviet Politburo member who is "vacationing" in Rumania, calls on Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary General of the Rumanian CP.

September 7-8: Sheikh Muktar Mohamed Hussein, President of the Somali National Assembly, heads a 21 member delegation arriving in Shanghai by air on 7 September and proceeding to Peking on 8 September. The group leaves Peking a week later for a tour to Wuhan, Changsha, Canton, and Mao's birthplace.

September 7-8: Belgrade Radio and TANYUG report on the investigations of the security services in Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Croatia. The conclusions are typified by those in the Montenegrin report: the security service did not commit political abuses, but it did carry on an exaggerated surveillance of sociopolitical life, place the service above democratic institutions, and show a lack of confidence in the workers and in the system of self-management. In Serbia and Croatia, it is suggested that some security functions be turned over to other bodies, e.g., investigation proceedings might be turned over to the courts. Succeeding days produce further comment on the past activities of the Yugoslav security police. On 15 September, two Serbian party leaders, former associates of Rankovic, are expelled from the party.

September 8-19: A delegation from the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly, headed by Jean Chamont, arrives in the USSR. After touring through Leningrad, Kiev, and Novosibirsk, they visit Podgorny in the Kremlin on September 17. On 19 September, Chamont says that the USSR and France share a common view on the war in Vietnam.

September 8-9: The 18th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic Republic of North Korea (DPRK) is celebrated at a meeting at Pyongyang on 8 September. The guests on the platform include Soviet, Vietnamese and Cuban delegates, but no Chinese representative. At Peking, instead

of the "rally" which was held for this anniversary last year with Chou En-lai and Liu Shao-chi attending, this year's North Korean Embassy reception (September 9) is a "meeting" with no one higher than Chen Yi present. Chen uses the occasion for hard-line denunciations of revisionism and of the Japanese government.

September 9: Bulgaria celebrates the 22nd anniversary of its "socialist revolution." (An interesting sequel to this occurs on 15 September, six days later, when the Bulgarian state security service celebrates the 22nd anniversary of its establishment.)

September 9: A North Vietnamese economic delegation, led by Le Thanh Nghi, arrives in Budapest. The delegation later visits Bulgaria and arrives in Rumania on September 17.

September 9: AP reports that according to the Hong Kong Chinese-language New Life Evening Post, Mao has had cancer of the throat and although slightly improved, is no longer able to make a lengthy speech.

September 10-11: Walter Ulbricht pays a "friendship visit" to Moscow, talks with Brezhnev and Yu. V. Andropov. Ulbricht and his wife also dine with Brezhnev, Mazurov, Podgorniy, Polyanskiy and Suslov. Izvestiya reports on September 11 that the main topic of the talks is the problem of European security.

September 10-11: Representatives of the parliaments of Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, Sweden, and Yugoslavia hold a two-day meeting in Belgrade. A press release states that the delegates believe that a conference of members of European parliaments should be held, with an agenda subject to the approval of the parliaments.

September 11-14: The South Vietnamese elections of 11 September are denounced in all Soviet, Chicom, DRV, etc. outlets. People's Daily, Peking, claims on 14 September that the election was a complete fiasco: "Even bayonets failed to bring the people to the 'polling stations' in the U.S.-puppet-held areas, and no one showed any interest in the farce... The South Vietnamese people have stoutly repudiated the 'civilian government' to be concocted by U.S. imperialism, and they have firmly signified their determination to battle for independence and liberation." On the whole, Hanoi and Moscow do not venture to follow the Chinese "big lie" technique of denying that anyone had voted, and instead concentrate on the argument that the people had been forced to vote. Prague CTK quotes the New York Post of 12 September to the effect that Soviet criticisms of elections procedures are unpleasantly close to the truth, but that one could not simply say that the elections were a farce.

September 11-16: The 16th Pugwash conference of scientists and scholars from East and West meets at Sopot, Poland. Topics of discussion include: disarmament in Europe; the alleviation of European tensions,

with special reference to the German problem; the possibility of general and complete disarmament, and the banning of nuclear tests. According to PAP's final communique, the meeting endorsed the Rapacki plan and the recognition of existing frontiers, but failed to agree on Vietnam. Earlier, Antonin Snejdarek, a Czech historian, had told a press conference that the delegates had reached complete agreement that the war in Vietnam was a danger to relations between European nations and to peace and security in Europe. U.S. historian Henry Kissinger took strong exception to this, however, and brought pressure for a more honest report in the final communique.

September 12: E. F. Hill, Chairman of the pro-Chicom Australian CP (Marxist-Leninist) arrives with his wife in Peking, and is met at the airport by a high-level CCP delegation headed by Chou En-lai. In succeeding days, NCNA frequently reports Hill's presence at important rallies and his endorsement of Mao's theories.

September 12-14: In a 12 September report on the visit to Belgrade of Couve de Murville, French Foreign Minister, and on his talks with top Yugoslav officials, Radio Belgrade Domestic Service says that "the views of the two countries were very close, particularly as regards the construction of general European security, the solution of the German problem, as well as regarding cooperation among the peoples of the European continent." Couve reportedly took the view that the two preconditions for German reunification were: 1) Germany should recognize present frontiers; and (2) Germany should renounce nuclear weapons. Couve said that the Vietnamese problem could only be solved by negotiation, but that the U.S. attitude did not approach a political solution, on the contrary. (Couve left for Paris on 14 September.)

September 12: Tiyupao, a Chinese sports newspaper, hails the opening of selective trials for "the first Asian games of the new emerging forces" at Peking, marking the Chicom assumption of control of "Ganefo," once the propaganda child of Indonesian leader Sukarno. In Indonesia, Sukarno states on September 13 that he has never deviated from the source of the [Indonesian] national revolution; he had studied Marx from the age of 16; "I am a nationalist, a theist, and a Marxist." On 14 September, the Indonesian Academicians Action Front calls for his resignation.

September 14-21: NCNA announces the arrival of a team from the Vietnamese People's Army to take part in "friendly contests among fraternal armies" in radio high-speed receiving and transmitting. According to NCNA, a DPRK team is also to take part in the contests, which are to begin on 21 September.

September 14: NCNA quotes "foreign friends who have been visiting China" as endorsing the cultural revolution. Similar quotations appear on 15 September. On September 17, People's Daily devotes a page to acclamations for Mao's thought from various countries: it cites a

Jacques Grippa (pro-Chicom leader in Belgium) editorial, a statement of "boundless love" from the overseas Chinese in France, an alleged pro-Chinese rally in Italy, and a statement by a representative of the Japanese Trade Promotion Society. On 20 September People's Daily carries statements of admiration for Mao's ideas from the Chilean Revolutionary CP, Algeria, and Burma; the next day the same journal prints a full page of tributes to Mao from Afro-Asian writers and from Vanguard, a publication of Hill's Australian CP (M-L).

September 15-17: The East German SED holds its 13th Central Committee Plenum, which schedules a new party congress for 17-22 April 1967. Hermann Axen, candidate member of the SED Politburo, sharply denounces the Chinese:

"What goes on in China under the slogan of a great proletarian revolution is no longer an internal Chinese matter. It is the worst international discrediting of socialism, of Marxism-Leninism, carried out by misusing revolutionary concepts which are dear to us."

Axen says the slogans of the Chinese 11th plenum (August 1-12) are reminiscent of the theses proclaimed by Trotsky 40 years ago on shaking up trade unions and industrializing by military force. He continues:

"[The cultural revolution] is the most extreme form to date of what Lenin in his work 'Leftwing Communism -- An Infantile Disorder' criticized most sharply as petit bourgeoisism [Klein-buergerium] run wild, which he rejected and combatted as incompatible with Marxism and the proletarian class struggle."

Further on, Axen says:

"Instead of relying on the organized character and awareness of the working class, the Chinese leadership is leaning on the anarchist actions of pupils and students who have been subjected to incitement."

Another speaker, Kurt Hager, says that the cultural revolution runs counter to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and that it conjures up the danger that the Chinese people will lose their socialist achievements. The main speech, by Walter Ulbricht, touches only lightly on the sins of Peking and concentrates on European security and the problem of the two Germanies. Ulbricht states: "Since the establishment of the two German states, the situation has developed in such a way and the power balance in Europe is such that the extended coexistence of the two German states must be anticipated."

September 15: Mao attends a huge Peking rally, with a claimed attendance of one million, his third "meeting with the revolutionary masses" in less than a month; again, he does not speak: only Lin Piao and Chou En-lai do. Lin indicates that "some people" have been creating

antagonism between the masses of workers and peasants and the revolutionary students and says:

"The present movement's main target of attack is those within the party who are in power and taking the capitalist road. Bombard the headquarters and you bombard the handful of people in power who are taking the capitalist road."

Chou, on the other hand, says:

"Comrades and students, to ensure the normal operation of industrial and agricultural production, the Red Guards and revolutionary students of various colleges and middle schools at present should not go to factories, enterprises, governmental organizations under county level, and rural people's communes to exchange revolutionary experience."

He points out that factories and rural areas do not have vacation like the schools to suspend production for making revolution. Red Guards and students should go to the countryside in an organized manner to participate in productive labor. People's Daily also makes the point made by Chou about the workers not having vacation, and says: "Production must not be interrupted." In covering this rally, Pravda (18 September) does not report any remarks intended to restrain the Red Guards, saying merely that they had been told that they:

"were acting correctly and well, that they had shaken up the entire society, produced panic, and had scored 'brilliant' military successes in the liquidation of the old ideology, old culture, old morals and customs.... Mao Tse-tung resolutely supported their revolutionary acts...."

September 15: In Albania, a Zeri I Popullit article gives full support to Peking, saying: "the Khrushchevite revisionists... do not hesitate to collect and exploit all the slanders and the sordid stories put out by the hotbeds of bourgeois propaganda in order to present China's cultural revolution in a false light, to denigrate the CCP, and to besmirch and offend the great Chinese people."

September 16: General P. P. Kumaramangalam, Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, arrives in Moscow at the invitation of Marshal M. V. Zakharov. He sees Zakharov and Marshal Rodion Malinovskiy on 17 September.

September 16: An editorial in Red Flag (theoretical Chicom journal) says:

"The great proletarian cultural revolution is not aimed at struggling against all leading cadres, nor is it aimed at struggling against the masses in any form or under any pretext...."

Any method of forcing a minority holding different views to submit is impermissible. The minority should be protected, because sometimes the truth is with the minority. Even if the minority is wrong, it should still be allowed to argue its case and reserve its views. Every revolutionary comrade should conscientiously implement the above-mentioned decision drawn up under the personal guidance of Chairman Mao...."

But another article in the same issue of Red Flag, by "Commentator," lauds the Red Guards and glories in accusations that the Red Guards are young fanatics, violators of human dignity, and destroyers of social tradition. "Frankly speaking, we should not only violate their 'dignity,' but knock them down so that they can never rise up agains." (Note that this may be a reference to the Soviet protest note of 26 August; see under August 31 above.) In answer to a reported statement of Pope Paul that the Red Guards are a "sign of death and not of life," Commentator agrees that the Guards are a "sure sign of final destruction for class enemies at home and abroad," but adds that they are also a sign that the revolutionary cause is "infinitely alive."

September 18: NCNA says that over 100,000 Peking Red Guards and revolutionary teachers and students are now helping with the harvest in the outskirts of Peking. Another story says that this is happening in many parts of the country. NCNA on September 19 seeks to identify the workers and peasants with the cultural revolution, and cites examples of increases of production due to the great revolution. "Members of the people's communes were filled with enthusiasm when the happy news about Chairman Mao's meeting with the revolutionary young people [on 15 September] spread through the villages."

September 18: Sweden holds local elections: the Swedish Communist Party, which under Carl Henrik Hermansson has been trying to project a progressive, national-oriented image, increases its vote by 2.4 percent, raising its total to 6.6 percent. At the same time, the Social Democratic vote drops from 51 percent to 42.8 percent.

September 18: In North Korea, Rodong Shinmoon (according to Pravda) publishes an editorial on "Trotskyism," stating that the Trotskyites "claimed that the improvement of material and cultural conditions of the people under socialism would lead to corruption and degradation of the society and create the danger of the restoration of capitalism," that they "emphatically objected to combining violent and non-violent methods in the revolutionary struggle," and that they "tried their utmost to unite their supporters in various countries by inciting them to engineer a split in the ranks of the international Communist movement." The views ascribed here to the Trotskyites appear to be those currently attributed (at least by the Soviets) to the CCP leaders.

September 19-26: After only two days advance public notice, Leonid Brezhnev and CPSU CC Secretary Yuriy Andropov leave for a visit to

Bulgaria. From there they depart on September 22 for Belgrade, and continue on to Budapest on 25 September. Very little is disclosed about any of these meetings, but the Budapest communique (26 September) conveys a sharp anti-American tone and says that both sides "hold the same views on the need to insure peace and security in Europe in accordance with the measures set out in the Budapest declaration of the Warsaw Pact states."

September 19: Granma, leading Cuban CP newspaper, publishes a speech by Armando Hart, made earlier in the month (exact date unknown) at a secret conference at Santiago de Cuba, charging that Cuban officials are indecisive and unaggressive, that they are "enclosed in a vicious circle of constant party reunions" instead of keeping in touch with the masses, and that farm managers are often dismissed by political officials who know even less than the men dismissed about agricultural matters. Hart also says:

"It is not a secret to any Cuban Communist that the world Communist movement is going through a tremendous crisis... [This crisis] is not confined, of course, within a polemic between two parties or a group of parties, but is something deeper and broader. Old concepts and habits of revolutionary work are being destroyed. Many of the erroneous notions [prevalent in Cuba] about Communist organizational methods are not foreign to this crisis."

September 20-22: The Warsaw Pact powers conduct the highly publicized Vltava maneuvers in Czechoslovakia, with much propaganda emphasis on the unity of the Warsaw Pact powers and their military strength. On 25 September, following the active maneuvers, ceremonies are held at Ceske Budejovice with speeches by Czech President Novotny and Soviet Marshal Grechko.

September 20: Czech Premier Lenart flies to North Vietnam. His delegation includes the Minister-Chairman of the State Commission for Technology, Dr. Vlasak, suggesting that aid will be discussed.

September 20: President Aden Abdullah Osman of Somalia arrives in Moscow and is met at the airport by Nikolay Podgorniy. The makeup of the Somalian delegation and remarks made by Podgorniy at a reception on 22 September suggest that Soviet aid for Somalia forms the main topic of discussion.

September 22: People's Daily (Peking) shows rage over the refusal of the Japanese government to grant passports to Japanese youths intending to take part in a Second Sino-Japanese Youth Friendship Festival: "The Sato government's unreasonable decision is in fact a 'united action' against China by the U.S. imperialists, the Japanese reactionaries, and the Soviet modern revisionists plus their followers." Chicom outlets continue to fulminate against the Japanese decision in succeeding days.

September 22: Komsomolskaya Pravda (daily of the Soviet Communist Youth League, Moscow) reports that Chicom leaders are advising the Red Guards against interrupting production. (This is the first Soviet mention of this we have noted.) But KP puts this in the context that the Red Guards are being told not to attack the bourgeoisie, making it appear that the CCP leadership is trying to protect the bourgeoisie while making no attempt to stop raids on party committees.

September 23: Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko addresses the United Nations General Assembly in New York. After denouncing U.S. policy in Vietnam, Gromyko turns his main attention to German and European security matters, saying: "Europe still remains the barometer of the world's political weather." Gromyko "admits" that West Germany could not hope to defeat the USSR and its allies, but says, "if the Federal Republic cannot win the war it can unleash it, if political recklessness drives it over the brink." Among other things, Gromyko urges that East Germany be admitted to the United Nations.

September 23: The Rumanian Vice Minister of Armed Forces, Lt. Gen. Vasili Ionel arrives in Peking with his wife; according to NCNA they were invited to spend their vacation there.

September 24: A New York Times story from Hong Kong says reports indicate that the Red Guard reign of terror has been costly in lives and property. One European diplomat is reported as having seen lynch mobs in action in the outskirts of Peking and other cities "systematically beating their victims to death"; he adds: "'If what I saw is a sample of what has been happening all over China, then hundreds of thousands of people must have been killed." Another European, who had been in central China, said that he saw Red Guards lead "literally thousands" of people out Wuhan and neighboring villages; when the Red Guards later returned alone, nobody would tell him what had happened to the people. The Times (25 September) adds, however, that "Washington analysts" are skeptical about reports of large-scale killings.

September 25: Foreign trade statistics made public in Moscow indicate that Soviet non-military exports to North Vietnam came to 67.1 million rubles in 1965, as compared with 42.9 million rubles in 1964. Exports to China also increased to 172.5 million rubles, 50 million rubles (to 203 million rubles) from the 1964 figure. Only 5000 rubles worth to an export of 860,000 rubles worth of films in 1960.

September 26: East German SED leader Walter Ulbricht arrives in Belgrade and is met at the station by Tito, Kardelj, Popovic and Petar Stambolic. In his reply to Tito's welcoming speech, Ulbricht says: "We welcome the Yugoslav initiative [in the field of peace] and in particular regarding the safeguarding of European security." A TANYUG release suggests that the Yugoslavs expect to discuss trade relations as well as political matters.